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ABSTRACT 1 
 2 
Several studies have dealt with the causes of urban sprawl, but consequences have been less 3 
demonstrated in the literature. Therefore, this paper considers the measurement of the effect that 4 
urban development model has on municipal fiscal burden. The geographical area of analysis is the 5 
Mediterranean area of Spain and Madrid. The main independent variable of the study is compact 6 
population and its calculation allows a new approach to the study of the populated environment. 7 
Other control variables are also considered in the period from 2006 and 2014. The findings confirm 8 
that scattered population could contribute to increase fiscal pressure. 9 
 10 
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INTRODUCTION 23 
 24 
The case of Spain is one of the most interesting in Europe concerning what is referred to 25 
sprawled development, because in some areas of this country, such as Mediterranean coast and 26 
Madrid, there is very great pressure to build due to tourism and the demand for a second residence 27 
(European Environment Agency, EEA 2006); this pressure on urban land on the Mediterranean 28 
coast is very high, as is that exerted on the main metropolitan areas such as Madrid, Barcelona, 29 
Bilbao and Valencia, among others (Rubiera et al. 2016). 30 
 31 
Although the greatest development of urban sprawl started around 1987 in the above-32 
mentioned cities in Spain (Muñoz 2007), there is a significant difference in the surface occupied by 33 
single-family houses among the Spanish regions. In relation to the total artificial surface, this 34 
percentage is relatively high in some cities, especially in the Balearic Islands, with 52.9%, followed 35 
by Catalonia with 39.2%, Valencian Region with 36.6% and Madrid with 28% (Moliní and Salgado 36 
2012). 37 
 38 
The expansion of tourism and residential settlement in the coastal municipalities on the 39 
Mediterranean, encouraged for decades by different administrations, has resulted in a strong 40 
competition for soil and water, with other economic functions, and the environment (Ortuño et al. 41 
2015). Several factors are underlying this process in Spain: newer forms of mobility, expansionary 42 
policies of land development, weak land use planning, housing typology specialisation of some 43 
municipalities, speculation (Bellet and Gutiérrez 2015), tourism and little attention to sustainable 44 
territorial planning (Grindlay et al. 2011). In that context, motorways are a key element for 45 
understanding the form of cities and regions because analyzing the periphery of virtually any city 46 
shows the indisputable organizing role that the networks of motorways play; nevertheless, these 47 
developments that have accompanied those of the motorways were not planned as part of the same 48 
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vision but have generally been the unplanned consequences of the motorway (Coronado et al. 49 
2009). 50 
 51 
Urban sprawl generates a series of environmental, social and economic impacts, as 52 
described in the Costs of Sprawl 2000 (National Research Council 2002). During the last years, 53 
Spanish local governments have faced budgetary restrictions and, in this regard, is important the 54 
prior consideration of future costs of operation and maintenance when planning for new investment 55 
(Lara-Galera et al. 2011). In that connection, the present paper will focus on the economic effects of 56 
the urban sprawl on the public capital, specifically, on the worsening of the urban tax burden. 57 
Besides, the financial crisis has tightened the budgets of local and regional administrations in Spain 58 
regardless of their size, which has implied a severe reduction in public services. 59 
                                                                  60 
The impact on fiscal burden is parallel with other economic effects of the urban sprawl on 61 
the public capital: the higher expenditure in infrastructure and the exploitation of public services 62 
with adverse impacts on the public finances. Henry (2007) points out that the annual public 63 
maintenance costs per household in a low density area are seven times higher than in a compact 64 
area, including direct costs – public land urbanization and supply of services –, indirect costs – land 65 
consumption and artificialization –, maintenance costs – of the public urbanization and services – 66 
and out-of-pocket costs, such as those derived from transport, the provision of services, the 67 
environmental effects and the change in life styles. 68 
 69 
The conceptual model presented by Paulsen (2014) can serve as a template or benchmark 70 
against with to evaluate fiscal impact analysis techniques, according to the existing theory: new 71 
land development within a city generates changes in revenues and expenditures which reflect the 72 
fiscal impact of that land development, including not only direct changes but also indirect and 73 
induced effects as prices, rents, incomes, and households all adapt in response to direct effects. 74 
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 75 
Socioeconomic factors could increase tax burden, but other relevant factors can also have a 76 
major influence on local budgets, which is tourism or local fiscal capacity (Carrasco et al. 2006). In 77 
Voltes-Dorta et al. (2014) –using data from Spanish local corporations for the years 2001-2010–, 78 
results indicate a direct relationship between tourism intensity and local deficits only in the smallest 79 
and largest municipalities, while a beneficial effect is actually seen in the remainder of the sample. 80 
As regards fiscal capacity, municipalities that enjoy a high degree of tax autonomy, will have to 81 
make some fiscal effort and the consequent increase in fiscal burden will take place (Sánchez-82 
Sánchez and Poveda-Blanco 2002; Benito et al. 2010). 83 
 84 
According to some authors (Tufte 1978; Lee 1987; Gonçalvez and Veiga 2007; Benito et al. 85 
2010), each electoral year also affects the fiscal burden because political leaders might reduce taxes 86 
or shift some of the tax burden from one group to another in order to gather votes as elections tactic. 87 
 88 
Based on the previous, this study aims to determine the extent to which changes in compact 89 
population of municipalities in the Mediterranean area of Spain and Madrid (Figure 1) – which 90 
includes the provinces of Alicante, Almeria, Balearic Islands, Barcelona, Castellon, Girona, 91 
Granada, Madrid, Malaga, Murcia, Tarragona and Valencia – affect the municipal fiscal burden in 92 
the more sprawled areas of Spain. In this article, a quantitative analysis is conducted based on an 93 
econometric model of panel data collected from 2006 to 2014. 94 
  95 
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Figure 1. Location of the provinces of study, as selected in Fernández-Aracil and Ortuño-96 
Padilla (2016). 97 
 98 
The linkage between fiscal issues and urban development, nowadays, have not been 99 
completely browsed, because such discussions regarding local budgets in Spain, has usually focused 100 
on public expenditure in prior periods (Hortas-Rico and Solé-Ollé 2010; Prieto et al. 2015). 101 
Inversely, fiscal burden has been studied related to other causal relationships (Benito et al. 2010), 102 
without considering the urban development model. 103 
 104 
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The analysis confirms the main hypothesis: the decrease in compact population impacts on 105 
the increase in the municipal tax burden. In this sense, the speed with which the patterns of 106 
population growth and land use changed is a factor which worked against the capability of it being 107 
managed efficiently; this is because these changes had not been foreseen and no strategies had been 108 
put into effect in time to manage development or mitigate the possible negative effects of the 109 
changes: it was only after the expansion had taken place that the development control mechanisms 110 
to deal with them were developed (García-Coll 2011). For this reason, it is important to quantify the 111 
impacts and to prevent how they can influence local decision-making. 112 
 113 
 114 
DATA AND METHODS 115 
 116 
Per capita local revenues, coming through direct and indirect taxes, according to the 117 
respective direct and indirect fiscal impact proposed by Paulsen (2014), are used to proxy the fiscal 118 
burden variable, which is the dependent variable of a panel data model conducted by combining 119 
procedures from previous similar studies (Solé-Ollé 2001; Bel 2006; Benito et al. 2010; Voltes-120 
Dorta 2014). 121 
 122 
The research focuses on the municipalities of the Mediterranean area of Spain and Madrid, 123 
spanning the period 2006-2014, which together encompass a population of over 24 million living in 124 
1,918 cities (National Statistical Institute 2016). Mediterranean area represents an ideal setting to 125 
study the impact of scattered population on fiscal burdens; its numerous municipalities have a high 126 
percentage of surface occupied by single-family houses in relation to the total artificial surface 127 
(Moliní and Salgado 2012). EEA (2006) emphasizes hot spots of urban sprawl there, which are 128 
common along already highly populated coastal strips, such as in the case of the southeast of Spain. 129 
 130 
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The municipality is the most appropriate geographical unit of analysis because it is the 131 
minimum subdivision of the administration in Spain that provides local public services. Moreover, 132 
looking at lower-level governments offers an interesting means to test the municipal finances on 133 
much broader and more homogeneous databases (Ashworth et al. 2005). 134 
 135 
Spain is one of the most fiscal decentralized countries in the world (Lago-Peñas et al., 136 
2017) and there are three administration levels involved: at the national level, the Ministry of 137 
Finance and Civil Service is responsible for the national taxes of the central government (for 138 
instance, corporate, income or value added taxes); at the regional level, the autonomous regions (or 139 
autonomous communities) handle its own direct power of taxation as long as this does not conflict 140 
with national regulation (for instance, capital gains, inheritance or gift taxes); and, at the local level, 141 
the municipal authorities manage the local public services in their areas of responsibility, whose 142 
funding is guaranteed by the structure of the local budgets, which consist of budget settlements that 143 
can be grouped into two blocks: local expenditures and local revenues. 144 
 145 
The budget settlements included in the structure of the local expenditures are as follows: (0) 146 
public debt; (1) basic public services (public safety, mobility, housing, urban planning, urban 147 
services and environment); (2) social protection and promotion (social welfare and promotion of 148 
employment); (3) public assets of preferential nature (healthcare, education, culture and sports); (4) 149 
economic actions (agriculture, farming, fishing, industry, energy, commerce, tourism, small and 150 
medium enterprises, public transport, infrastructures and research); and (5) general actions 151 
(government and fiscal administration). 152 
 153 
With regard to the structure of local revenues, budget settlements are organized in this way: 154 
(1) direct taxes (for instance, property taxes, motor vehicle taxes or tax on land value 155 
improvements); (2) indirect taxes (for instance, construction taxes or property transfer taxes); (3) 156 
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user charges (for instance, planning permissions and public services fees); (4) current transfers 157 
(from other autonomous bodies of local government or from other levels of government, such as 158 
national or regional scales); (5) asset revenues (such as equity revenues); (6) real investment sales 159 
(such as public land sales); (7) capital transfers; (8) financial assets; and (9) financial liabilities. 160 
 161 
As discussed in section 1, previous studies have identified a number of determinants of 162 
fiscal burden including institutional variables or socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. 163 
The general equation (1) to perform the estimation is as follows: 164 
 165 
log⁡(𝑌𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑗 · log⁡(𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀        (1) 166 
 167 
Where ‘Yit’ are fiscal burden of municipality ‘i’ on year ‘t’, ‘Xit’ are independent variables, ‘β’ are 168 
vectors of regression coefficients, and ‘ε’ is the error term. 169 
 170 
Addressing the study of fiscal burden, the model is consistent with Benito et al. (2010) and 171 
Carrasco et al. (2006), but rests on a new set of independent variables to integrate the importance of 172 
compact population on fiscal stress. Precisely, local per capita public taxes regresses on 173 
sociodemographic and compactness variables, fiscal characteristics such as local fiscal capacity, 174 
tourism, and additional dummy variables related to the municipal electoral year and the recession 175 
period. 176 
 177 
Dependent variable, per capita revenues from direct and indirect taxes between 2006 and 178 
2014 (BURDEN), is the sum of budget settlements of local authorities regarding two income 179 
categories: direct taxes and indirect taxes. The source is Ministry of the Finance and Public 180 
Administrations 2016. 181 
 182 
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Tables 1 and 2 summarize the independent variables used in the equation, as well as their 183 
statistical parameters and sources. 184 
 185 
TABLE 1 186 
 187 
TABLE 2 188 
 189 
Dependent variables 190 
 191 
The local provision of public services is financed primarily from local taxes (which include 192 
the property tax, local business tax and local motor vehicle tax) and the grants that local 193 
governments receive from upper levels of government (current transfers and capital transfers); thus, 194 
the econometric specification includes per capita tax revenues –direct and indirect taxes– as the 195 
dependent variable, which can be considered as a proxy of fiscal burden (Benito et al. 2010). 196 
Revenues are established in constant terms – in adjusted 2011 euros – by using the consumer price 197 
index (CPI) of each province (National Statistical Institute 2016). 198 
 199 
Independent variables 200 
 201 
One of the most controversial topics in urban sprawl studies is the way in which the sprawl 202 
is defined and measured. For example, on the one hand, Glaeser and Kahn (2004) argue that sprawl 203 
is the inexorable product of car-based living and they conceptualize urban compactness from a 204 
unidimensional point of view as urban density, defined as people per square mile. On the other 205 
hand, Arribas-Bel et al. (2011) categorize and extract the most relevant six dimensions that define 206 
the term urban sprawl, such as scattering, connectivity, availability of open space, density, 207 
decentralization and land-use mix. Similarly, Jaeger et al. (2010) measure the degree of urban 208 
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dispersion as the average weighted distance between any two points chosen randomly within the 209 
urban areas in the landscape investigated and three new measures are determined from this urban 210 
dispersion: total sprawl, degree of urban permeation of the landscape, and sprawl per capita. 211 
 212 
But the characterization of urban sprawl in Galster et al. (2001) is amongst the most precise 213 
and clear (2011), where sprawl is defined as a condition of land use that is represented by low 214 
values on one or more of these eight distinct dimensions: density, continuity, concentration, 215 
clustering, centrality, nuclearity, mixed uses, and proximity. Connecting with this approach and 216 
according to Fernández-Aracil and Ortuño-Padilla (2016), compact population here indicates a 217 
conceptualized measure of concentration, given that sprawl and compact development are 218 
characterized not only by density but also by other variables (Ewing and Hamidi 2015), and is 219 
based on the elementary definition of Berry (1976). 220 
 221 
Compact population was calculated by screening techniques on INE statistics (INE is the 222 
acronym, in Spanish, of the National Institute of Statistics of Spain) called Nomenclátor or list of 223 
place names, according to the theoretical foundation presented by Goerlich and Cantarino (2013) 224 
discerning about what is urban, considered here as a quantitative metric to appraise urban form. 225 
 226 
In order to know how population is classified into different areas, National Statistical Institute 227 
(2016) provides more comprehensive definitions of subdivision of the populated areas in a specific 228 
municipality by focusing on the municipal register of inhabitants and the list of places called 229 
Nomenclátor: 230 
• A municipality is divided into singular population entities, depending on the distribution of 231 
the population throughout the territory. 232 
• A singular population entity is considered a nucleus if is made up of a set of at least ten 233 
buildings, with streets, urban roads and squares. 234 
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• Exceptionally, the number of buildings will be less than 10, as long as the population that 235 
lives there exceeds 50 inhabitants. In addition, buildings that, being isolated, measure less 236 
than 200 m from the exterior limits of the mentioned set, are included in the nucleus. 237 
• Buildings of a singular population entity that may not be included in the concept of a 238 
nucleus are considered as a scattered, and their population, as scattered population. 239 
 240 
Keeping in mind what has been defined, the main independent variable, that defines urban 241 
model, represents the number of inhabitants in a population nucleus classified as compact 242 
population (COMPAC): if the population of the nucleus is equal to or larger than 2,000 inhabitants 243 
(in the reference year 2014). If a given municipality has more than one population nucleus with 244 
2,000 inhabitants and further, compact population is the sum of population of each nucleus. The 245 
remaining population is categorized as dispersed. 246 
 247 
The choice of this threshold of 2,000 inhabitants is motivated by the fact that a European 248 
regulation on a public service, wastewater treatment, has standardized the lower limit of their 249 
efficient provision (European Union, EU 1991). This figure reflects when a population nucleus may 250 
cease to be viable, in an economically efficient way (Prieto et al. 2015) and enables operationalize 251 
the scrutiny of compact population (Fernández-Aracil and Ortuño-Padilla 2016). 252 
 253 
On the other hand, a number of control variables have been introduced in the function to take 254 
into account the impact of socioeconomic factors (DUCRIS and DUTOUR), demography 255 
(POPULA and INCREA), fiscal capacity (LEVELA) or municipal electoral years (DUELEC) on 256 
fiscal burden. 257 
  258 
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Population size (POPULA) and annual population growth (INCREA), compared with the same 259 
period of previous year, are also included in the model because imposes fiscal burdens on 260 
established residents in the form of lower service levels (Ladd 1992). 261 
 262 
Level of fiscal capacity (LEVELA) measures the financial capacity of a municipality by itself 263 
as the proportion of revenue sections 1, 2 and 3 (direct taxes, indirect taxes and user charges, which 264 
are the three budget settlements with tax nature) over total revenues of each municipality, which 265 
translates into a higher potential for revenue generation and less dependence on regional and central 266 
government transfers (Benito et al. 2010). 267 
 268 
Electoral year at municipal level (DUELEC) is an important control variable, since it is 269 
expected that local politicians tend to reduce taxes, with a clear electoral intent (Gonçalvez and 270 
Veiga 2007). The crisis dummy (DUCRIS) takes on the value ‘‘1’’ for any crisis year and ‘‘0’’ 271 
otherwise. The period during which the crisis has occurred was limited to 2008-2013, because a 272 
given year has been considered into recession when the growth rate of gross domestic product has 273 
experienced negative sign during any trimester of the year. Tourism (DUTOUR) is included as a 274 
dummy in order to take into account the effect of potential users of public infrastructure, although 275 
they are a transitory visitor population (Voltes-Dorta et al. 2014). 276 
 277 
Table 3 provides total amounts and averages of some variables at province level for the year 278 
2014. It should be noted that Tarragona and Malaga actually have an additional municipality since 279 
2011, which inclusion has not been possible because complete time series are not available. 280 
 281 
TABLE 3 282 
 283 
 284 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 285 
 286 
The impact of compact population on fiscal burden, controlling for other factors, is tested 287 
by estimating the linear specifications described in equation (2): 288 
 289 
log(𝐵𝑈𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 · log⁡(𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2 · log⁡(𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 · 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ·290 
log⁡(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5 · 𝐷𝑈𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 · 𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 · 𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀   (2) 291 
 292 
When addressing panel data econometrics, different methods could be used: Generalized 293 
Least Squares (GLS), GLS with fixed effects or GLS with random effects. If the presence of 294 
individual effects is detected by means of a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test, it can be then 295 
studied the possibility of adding fixed or random effects. A model with random effects will provide 296 
results that are more efficient, but should be used only if possible. When the hypothesis of the 297 
Hausman test is confirmed (the coefficients estimated with random effects are the same as those 298 
estimated by fixed effects), a model with random effects could be used (Wooldridge 2002). 299 
 300 
Table 4 presents the fixed effects estimation results of the model, with fiscal burden as a 301 
dependent variable, using Stata software and according to equation (2), where R-square displays a 302 
very high value: 303 
 304 
TABLE 4 305 
 306 
In the light of the results, negative and statistically significant coefficients are: compact 307 
population (COMPAC), population size (POPULA), and municipal electoral year (DUELEC). This 308 
implies that the increase of this factors, or their presence (in the case of DUELEC), contributes to 309 
decrease fiscal burden. 310 
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 311 
Numerically, a 1% increase in compact population is associated with a decrease of 0.116% 312 
euros per capita in fiscal burden. Therefore, population size of a municipality possibly has a greater 313 
effect, whose increase of 1%, generates 0.795% decrease in the fiscal burden; however, their more 314 
rapid variation generates the increase of fiscal burden. 315 
 316 
On each of the local election years, fiscal burden decreases approximately 0.035%, 317 
according to the above-mentioned theory. 318 
 319 
The estimated coefficients, and statistically significant, for fiscal capacity and crisis are 320 
positive and confirm the expectations. They indicate that an increase of 1% of revenues coming 321 
from sections 1, 2 and 3 with respect to total local revenues (fiscal capacity) generate an increase of 322 
1.332% in fiscal burden; in fact, in a recession period, fiscal burden is 0.124% higher, precisely to 323 
compensate the reduction of indirect revenues in recession period. 324 
 325 
Essentially, tourism is not an influential factor in fiscal burden. Whereas tourist activity 326 
could increase public expenditure of municipalities, this is not directly reflected in their revenues, 327 
which has been used in this analysis as a proxy of fiscal burden, but it is mainly reflected in current 328 
transfers. For this reason, in the absence of a specific tourist tax (with the exception of the 329 
autonomous regions of Catalonia and Balearic Islands), required to cover the net costs incurred in 330 
manage extra public charges as a consequence of tourist activity, local administrations in tourist 331 
areas suffer from chronic deficit as a result of the limited funding alternatives to help them cover 332 
their increased expenditures (Voltes-Dorta 2014). 333 
 334 
 335 
 336 
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CONCLUSIONS 337 
 338 
Results of this study provide evidence on how changes of the urban development model 339 
could impact on local fiscal burden. The paper has focused on the Mediterranean area of Spain and 340 
Madrid, areas of strong urban dynamism, covering the period 2006-2014 and analyzing in depth the 341 
fiscal sustainability of a model of urban growth characterized by the dispersion of the population. In 342 
a context of budgetary crisis, the topic of the paper is timely and can be used as a tool for municipal 343 
policy makers in order to prioritize the future investments and reorient the future urban plans. 344 
Moreover, the methodology used in the paper could be extrapolated to other regions in the world, 345 
however results may differ in nature according to the conditions in each fiscal system; for instance, 346 
the proxy variable used to measure fiscal burden could be different or governments (the specific 347 
tiers of government involved in each candidate geographic area) may have implemented 348 
differentiated taxation instruments to fully cover specified and real expenditure needs. 349 
 350 
In general, the increase in fiscal burden due to a more sprawled urban development model, 351 
generates decline in socioeconomic sustainability mainly driven by the increase in demand for 352 
higher taxes in order to fully cover public services. In fact, fiscal stress –tax burden, legal 353 
limitations on local tax levels and the amount of transfers from the central to local governments– 354 
and pressure from interest group are considered explanatory factors of local privatization of services 355 
(Bel and Fageda 2007). 356 
 357 
The land use reform movement that produced most of the contemporary anti-sprawl policy 358 
frameworks was led by critical thought regarding the extent to which development patterns actually 359 
serve the best interests of their inhabitants (Calthorpe 1993). If the local budget depends on the 360 
taxation of local firms and population, local authorities first should perceive the fiscal consequences 361 
of urban sprawl as an urgent problem (Brueckner and Kim 2003). 362 
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Finally, this work suggests that municipal planning or taxation instruments could 363 
contribute, in reverse, to decrease fiscal burden; namely, the municipal planning instruments and 364 
taxation policies must shift the focus of development towards the consolidation of existing urban 365 
areas, rather than encouraging sprawl (Almeida et al. 2013). This could for example be achieved via 366 
discriminatory taxation instruments, according to the real consumption of local public services, 367 
considering not only their provision, but also their long-term maintenance. Nevertheless, fiscal 368 
discrimination should be homogeneous in the country, because if a municipality has impact fees but 369 
the adjacent did not, could appear spillover effects that exacerbate sprawl (Burge et al. 2013). 370 
 371 
 372 
NOTATION 373 
The following symbols are used in this paper: 374 
BURDEN = dependent variable, per capita revenues from direct and indirect taxes; 375 
β = vectors of regression coefficients; 376 
COMPAC = number of inhabitants in a population nucleus classified as compact population; 377 
DUELEC = a dummy for electoral years; 378 
DUCRIS = a crisis dummy; 379 
DUTOUR = a dummy for tourist municipalities; 380 
ε = error term; 381 
INCREA = annual population growth compared with the same period of previous year; 382 
i = municipality; 383 
LEVELA = level of fiscal capacity; 384 
POPULA = Population size; 385 
t = year; 386 
X = independent variables; 387 
Y = fiscal burden of municipality; 388 
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Table 1. Description of independent variables. 551 
Independent variables 
(name) 
Indicator (source) 
Amount of compact 
population (COMPAC). 
Population that is included in a population nucleus of the 
Nomenclátor and with more than 2,000 inhabitants (National 
Statistical Institute 2016). 
Population size (POPULA). Total annual population of each municipality (National Statistical 
Institute 2016). 
Annual population growth 
(INCREA). 
Municipal growth rate of population, compared to the previous 
year (National Statistical Institute 2016). 
Level of fiscal capacity 
(LEVELA). 
Percentage of revenues coming from direct taxes; indirect taxes; 
fees and public prices with respect to the total revenues of each 
local authority (Ministry of the Finance and Public 
Administrations 2016). 
Electoral year (DUELEC). Dummy variable: 1, for each electoral year at municipal level in 
Spain; 0, otherwise (National Statistical Institute 2016). 
Recession year (DUCRIS). Dummy variable: 1, for each recession year in Spain; 0, otherwise 
(National Statistical Institute 2016). 
Tourist spot (DUTOUR). Dummy variable: 1, for each tourist spot in Spain; 0, otherwise 
(National Statistical Institute 2016). 
  552 
26 
 
Table 2. Summary of the statistical parameters of the variables of the equation. 553 
Variable (unit) Obs. Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
BURDEN (€/inhabitant) 17,262 395.66 446.82 0.00 34,736.25 
COMPAC (inhabitants) 17,262 11,137.85 88,376.10 0.00 3,273,049.00 
POPULA (inhabitants) 17,262 12,556.48 88,927.76 15.00 3,273,049.00 
INCREA (%) 17,262 1.03 4.51 -38.32 82.19 
LEVELA (%) 17,262 44.07 20.01 0.00 96.40 
DUELEC (dummy) 17,262 0.22 0.42 0.00 1 
DUCRIS (dummy) 17,262 0.66 0.47 0.00 1 
DUTOUR (dummy) 17,262 0.03 0.17 0.00 1 
  554 
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Table 3. Total amounts and averages of some variables for the last year of study, 2014. 555 
Provinces 
Total 
local 
entities 
Total 
compact 
population 
(inhabitants) 
Total 
population 
(inhabitants) 
Average 
annual 
population 
growth 
(%) 
Average 
fiscal burden 
(€/inhabitant) 
Average 
fiscal 
capacity 
(%) 
Alicante  141 1,553,466 1,868,438 -4 387 63 
Almería 102 547,542 701,688 -2 322 38 
Baleares 67 887,051 1,103,442 -1 563 66 
Barcelona 311 5,045,150 5,523,784 0 511 56 
Castellón 135 477,882 587,508 -4 482 54 
Girona 221 548,337 756,156 2 543 56 
Granada 168 734,721 917,345 -1 242 35 
Madrid 179 6,313,288 6,454,440 -1 437 54 
Málaga 100 1,431,060 1,618,539 -3 410 41 
Murcia 45 1,143,447 1,466,818 -1 367 58 
Tarragona 183 609,592 795,155 -2 471 52 
Valencia 266 2,294,972 2,548,898 -1 436 56 
 556 
  557 
28 
 
Table 4. Determinants of the fiscal burden (t-statistics in parentheses). The statistical significance is 558 
expressed through *=5% and **=1%. 559 
 560 
Variables and parameters names Coefficients 
Compact population -0.116* (-2.14) 
Population size -0.795** (-13.04) 
Population growth 0.005** (5.65) 
Fiscal capacity 1.332** (263.28) 
Electoral year -0.035** (-4.33) 
Recession 0.124** (16.43) 
Tourism 0.026 (0.34) 
Constant 7.222** (16.59) 
R² 0.82 
F-statistic F(7,15337)= 10151.88* 
Breusch–Pagan test 
H0: var (μ) = 0 
Chi-square(1)= 10305.37  
Prob>chi-square= 0.0000 
Hausman test 
H0: difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi-square(7)=185.07 
Prob>chi-square= 0.0000 
 561 
